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Casenotes
Carter v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway:
The Appealability of Severance Orders
I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, a judgment cannot be appealed until it is final.I The
application of this final judgment rule is straightforward when a
controversy involves a single defendant and a single plaintiff. In
such a case, the losing party can appeal immediately upon the
court's final judgment.' In a case involving multiple parties or
claims, however, the judge may sever a claim or party when the
continued joint litigation would be inefficient or prejudicial. Alter-
natively, the judge may order separate trials if one claim or party
does not materially relate to the principal action.3 An order for
severance or for separate trials can create problems for a losing
party whose claim has been severed or separated when that party
seeks an immediate appeal of the case while the initial proceeding
1. Flores v. Dugan, 91 Ill. 2d 108, 112, 435 N.E.2d 480, 482 (1982). The Illinois
Supreme Court held that an appellate court does not have jurisdiction to review judg-
ments that are not final unless a supreme court rule provides for an interlocutory appeal.
Id. The court stated that a dismissal for want of prosecution is not a final judgment and,
therefore, is not appealable. Id. at 115, 435 N.E.2d at 483. Under section 24 of the
Limitations Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, para. 24(a) (1987), a plaintiff is allowed one
year to refile the same complaint and reargue the same issues to judgment. Flores, 91 Ill.
2d at 111-12, 435 N.E.2d at 481.
2. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 makes the general assertion that "every final
judgment of a circuit court in a civil case is appealable as of right." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
I 10A, para. 301 (1987). See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
3. Severance of claims and separation of claims or issues are considered to be interde-
pendent. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 314 (1985)
[hereinafter J. FRIEDENTHAL]. In Fischer & Porter Co. v. Haskett, 51 F.R.D. 305 (E.D.
Pa. 1970), the words "separate trials" and "severance" are used interchangeably within
the same sentence. Id. at 306. "Defendants agree that there should be separate trials in
this case, but argue that the severance should be such that the separate trials would be
solely on plaintiff's claim of ownership." Id. (emphasis added).
Although the two terms are often used interchangeably, the theory behind these two
devices are distinct. J. FRIEDENTHAL, supra, at 315. Separation typically occurs when
an action is divided into two or more claims or groups of claims. Id. Although the
groups are tried separately, only one judgment is rendered covering the entire original
action. Id. With severance, however, the claims in a single action are divided into sepa-
rate actions, and independent judgments are entered on each of the severed claims. Id. at
315-16.
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remains pending.4
In Carter v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway,- the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a judgment on a severed claim or a judg-
ment against a party in a case involving multiple claims or parties
must contain an express finding that there is "no just reason for
delay" before the severed portion may be appealed.6 The Carter
court further held that such a finding would be unnecessary only
when the trial court's severance order "clearly and unequivocally
stated that the claim, counterclaim or party had indeed been sev-
ered" and that it should proceed thereafter separate from the other
claims, counterclaims, or parties to the case.7
This Note analyzes the implications of the Carter decision for
judges and practitioners. First, the Note discusses various Illinois
Supreme Court interpretations of the Illinois Code of Civil Proce-
dure and the Illinois Supreme Court Rules regarding the finality
and appealability of orders entered against severed parties or
claims. The Note then examines the rationale of the Carter opin-
ion. Finally, this Note concludes that the Carter court adequately
resolved the confusion left by prior decisions concerning appeals of
severed actions because the court rejected the notion of invoking a
judicial test to determine if an appeal in such instances could be
taken.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Severance and the Separation of Trials
The Illinois Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to allow the
equitable joinder of parties and claims.8 Joinder is permitted when
the parties' claims arise out of the same general occurrence and
4. The decision to separate the claims or issues, however, is solely in the hands of the
trial judge and will not be overturned absent an obvious error. See J. FRIEDENTHAL
supra note 3, at 316. See also Ammesmaki v. Interlake S.S. Co., 342 F.2d 627, 630-31
(7th Cir. 1965) (the court of appeals stated that in a personal injury suit brought by an
employee against his employer and the owner of the dock where the injury occurred, a
single trial lessened delay, expense, and inconvenience, and that a decision to grant a
separate trial was for the discretion of the trial judge). Cf. Eichinger v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., 20 F.R.D. 204 (D. Neb. 1957) (the major concern in considering whether to
order a separate trial is obtaining a "just final disposition of the litigation").
5. 119 I11. 2d 296, 518 N.E.2d 1031 (1988).
6. Id. at 307-08, 518 N.E.2d at 1037 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 304(a)
(1987)).
7. Id. at 308, 518 N.E.2d at 1037.
8. Tone & Stifler, Joinder of Parties and Consolidation of Multi-party Actions, 1967 U.
ILL. L. F. 209, 216-17 (1967). Prior to the adoption of the equitable rules of party joinder
in the Civil Practice Act, Illinois common law rules allowed only persons who had joint
rights to join as plaintiffs and only those jointly liable to be joined as defendants. Id.
1052 [Vol. 20
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involve "common question[s] of law or fact." 9 Permitting the free
joinder of parties and claims is intended to promote judicial econ-
omy by preventing piecemeal litigation.' 0
The free joinder of claims and parties reduces potential duplica-
tion of suits, but it can also result in highly complex and confusing
litigation." Even though all the parties and claims in a multiple-
claim action may have been related sufficiently to justify joinder
when the action began, the action can develop such that the com-
plexity of the issues in the litigation, dissimilarity of the claims of
the parties, potential for jury confusion, and danger of prejudice to
the parties' rights make the action difficult to manage. 12
If the judge presiding over a multiple-claim action determines
that continued joint litigation of the claims would be inefficient or
prejudicial to the parties, the judge may provide for a separate trial
on some of the claims.'3 The judge can accomplish this by order-
ing either the separation of claims 4 or the severance of one or
more claims in the action.' 5 The judge may choose to order the
9. Section 2-404 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act provides that persons may join as
plaintiffs in a single action when each person alleges a right to relief arising out of the
same transaction or series of transactions. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-404 (1987).
Section 2-405 provides for the joinder of defendants under similar circumstances. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-405 (1987). Section 2-406 provides for the addition of new
parties necessary for the determination of the controversy. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-406 (1987). The joinder of additional claims and counterclaims brought by par-
ties to the action against other parties to the action is provided for in section 2-614. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-614(b) (1987). See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Antioch
Theatre, 52 Ill. App. 3d 122, 367 N.E.2d 247 (1st Dist. 1977); Opal v. Material Serv.
Corp., 9 Ill. App. 2d 433, 133 N.E.2d 733 (1st Dist. 1956).
10. See Tone & Stifler, supra note 8, at 209 (free joinder has helped eliminate "repeti-
tion of testimony, duplication of effort, and inconsistent verdicts").
11. Id. at 218-20.
12. Tone & Eovaldi, Separation of Trials and Appeals in Multiparty Actions, 1967 U.
ILL. L. F. 224, 225-29 (1967). The authors also listed undue delay, jurisdictional issues,
statute of limitations defenses, and laches defenses as problems that could result from the
joint litigation of multiple claims in a single action. Id. at 225-27.
13. Id. at 224-25.
14. A judge's power to order the separation of claims in a multiple claim action is
derived from sections 2-404 and 2-614(b) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, paras. 2-404, 2-614(b) (1987). Section 2-404 provides that if "it shall
appear that joinder may embarrass or delay the trial of the action, the court may order
separate trials or enter any other order that may be expedient." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-404 (1987). Similarly, section 2-614(b) states that "the court may, in its discre-
tion, order separate trial of any causes of action ... if it cannot be conveniently disposed
of with the other issues in the case." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-614(b) (1987).
15. A judge's power to sever a claim is derived from section 2-1006 of the Illinois
Civil Practice Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1006 (1987). Section 2-1006 pro-
vides that "an action may be severed ... as an aid to convenience, whenever it can be
done without prejudice to a substantial right." Id.
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separation of claims for a wide variety of reasons,I6 but the primary
reasons for ordering the separation of claims are to prevent the
joint litigation of overly complex issues and to avoid prejudice to
the parties.I7 The severance of claims may be ordered for the same
general reasons as separation of claims. I8 Regardless of the form of
the order that the court uses to provide for separate trials, the trial
judge's order will not be reversed unless there is a clear abuse of
discretion. 9
The combination of the court's power to permit joinder and it's
power to sever or separate claims in a multiple claim action pro-
vides a workable mechanism for dealing with multiple claim litiga-
tion at the trial stage. 2° The severance or separation of claims,
however, can create uncertainty for a party who wants to appeal a
judgment entered on one of the groups of claims created by the
severance or separation order. 2' This uncertainty arises from the
difficulty in applying Supreme Court Rule 304(a), the Illinois rule
governing the appealability of final judgments disposing of less
than all the claims or parties in an action, in cases where separate
trials have been ordered.22
16. Tone & Eovaldi, supra note 12, at 225.
17. Id. at 229 ("[a]lthough generalizations as to when separate trials should be given
are fraught with possibilities of error, it seems fair to say that most decisions . . . have
recognized that the goal of disposing of all related claims at one trial may conflict with
the goal of a fair trial to all parties").
18. J. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 3, at 316-17.
19. See, e.g., Needy v. Sparks, 51 Ill. App. 3d 350, 356, 366 N.E.2d 327, 335 (1st
Dist. 1977) (decision to sever a claim is "within the sound discretion of the trial court");
Glennon v. Glennon, 299 Ill. App. 13, 26, 19 N.E.2d 412, 417 (1st Dist. 1939) (decision
to separate the claims or issues is solely in the hands of the trial judge and will not be
overturned absent an obvious error).
20. Compare Northwest Water Comm'n v. Carlo V. Santucci, Inc., 162 Ill. App. 3d
877, 516 N.E.2d 287 (1st Dist. 1987) (causes of action were consolidated by the trial
court for the purposes of discovery and trial of a claim by a subcontractor against the
municipal water corporation) with Lowe v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 124 Il1. App. 3d 80, 99,
463 N.E.2d 792, 806 (5th Dist. 1984) (trial court abused its discretion in ordering the
consolidation of 47 suits for trial, absent any indication that all the plaintiffs suffered
physical impairments from exposure to chemicals on one of three separate occasions).
21. See, e.g., Carter v. Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry., 119 Ill. 2d 296, 518 N.E.2d 1031
(1988); Northtown Warehouse v. Transamerica Ins. Co., III Ill. 2d 532, 490 N.E.2d
1268 (1986); Lurz v. Panek, 166 Ill. App. 3d 179, 519 N.E.2d 1110 (2d Dist. 1988);
Salyers v. Board of Governors, 69 Ill. App. 3d 356, 387 N.E.2d 1129 (4th Dist. 1979);
Sadler v. County of Cook, 108 Il1. App. 3d 175, 438 N.E.2d 1351 (1st Dist. 1982).
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 304(a) (1987). See infra notes 33-35 and accom-
panying text.
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B. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a)
Rule 304(a) is designed to discourage piecemeal appeals.23 To
achieve this goal, rule 304(a) states that "any judgment that adju-
dicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all parties is not enforceable or appealable. ' 24 This rule
prevents an appellate court from obtaining jurisdiction over such
judgments by providing that those judgments are subject to revi-
sion until "all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties are
adjudicated."25
Although proponents of the rule sought to prevent unnecessary
and premature appeals, they also realized that final judgments26 on
certain groups of claims in multiple-claim actions should be al-
lowed. 27 Therefore, rule 304(a) permits appeal of such final judg-
ments. The rule states that:
If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an
action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial
court has made an express written finding that there is no just
reason for delaying enforcement or appeal.28
If the trial court enters a rule 304(a) finding on a judgment, the
parties appealing the judgment must file notice of appeal as pro-
vided in the rule.29
23. Martino v. Barra, 37 II1. 2d 588, 229 N.E.2d 545 (1967). Prior to 1956, the Illi-
nois appellate courts were plagued by undesirable piecemeal appeals. See Roddy v. Ar-
mitage-Hamlin Corp., 401 I11. 605, 83 N.E.2d 308 (1949) (order of dismissal was
appealable although the other count remained to be tried); Hoier v. Kaplan, 313 Ill. 448,
145 N.E. 243 (1924) (certain "extra items" dismissed from a complaint to foreclose a
mechanics' lien were held to be appealable, despite pending contract claims). See gener-
ally ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 304(a) (Smith-Hurd 1985) (historical and practice
notes) (prior to the enactment of section 50(2) a "judgment finally determining the rights
of fewer than all of the parties or fewer than all of the claims was appealable and indeed
had to be appealed if the rights of the party against whom the judgment had been entered
were to be preserved").
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IOA, para. 304(a) (1987).
25. Id. See also Mercado v. United Investors, Inc., 144 II1. App. 3d 886, 494 N.E.2d
824 (lst Dist. 1986); Hernandez v. Fahner, 135 I11. App. 3d 372, 481 N.E.2d 1004 (1st
Dist. 1985); Peter Fischer Import Motors v. Buckley, 121 I11. App. 3d 906, 460 N.E.2d
346 (1st Dist. 1984); Pecora v. Szabo, 109 I11. App. 3d 824, 441 N.E.2d 360 (2d Dist.
1982).
26. See Village of Burnham v. Cook, 146 IIl. App. 3d 124, 126, 496 N.E.2d 1034,
1036 (1st Dist. 1986) (a final order terminates the litigation between the parties on the
merits or disposes of the rights of the parties).
27. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1OA, para. 304(a) (1987).
29. Id. (rule 304(a) provides that "[t]he time for filing the notice of appeal shall run
from the entry of the required finding"). Rule 303(a) requires the notice of appeal to be
filed within 30 days after the entry of the judgment appealed. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10A,
1056 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 20
The application of rule 304(a) is fairly straightforward in many
situations. The Illinois courts have agreed that a rule 304(a) find-
ing cannot make a non-final judgment appealable. 30 Rule 304(a)
findings also are inapplicable to orders entered in single-party and
single-claim actions.3! Furthermore, the courts have used a case-
by-case approach when considering whether to include a rule
304(a) finding in multiple-claim actions in which all of the contro-
verted issues were litigated jointly.32 When a multiple claim-action
involves separate trials, however, the proper application of rule
304(a) is less clear.
The difficulty with applying rule 304(a) in cases where separate
trials have been ordered stems from the language of the rule itself.
The rule states that rule 304(a) findings can be made when "multi-
"133ple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action.
Some courts, relying on both this wording and federal court inter-
pretations of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure upon which rule
para. 303(a) (Smith-Hurd) (1987) (committee comments). Appellate courts, however,
have experienced difficulty in interpreting the rule and the supreme court has held that
"the time to appeal begins to run only after the court has disposed of the last timely post-
trial motion." In re Marriage of Uphoff, 99 I11. 2d 90, 95-96, 457 N.E.2d 426, 428 (1983).
But see Carter v. Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry., 119 Ill. 2d 296, 518 N.E.2d 1031 (1988).
Nonetheless, a party filing an appeal must do so within the 30-day requirement of rule
303. However, the point at which time starts running is different. For severed claims,
"the notice of appeal must be filed.., within 30 days after the entry of thefinaljudgment
appealed from." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 303(a)(1) (1987) (emphasis added).
When the separated claim is appealed pursuant to rule 304(a) the appeal must be filed
within 30 days of the rule 304(a) finding. Recall that rule 303(a) states that "if a timely
post-trial motion directed against the judgment is filed ... [the notice of appeal must be
filed] within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending post-trial
motion." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 303(a) (1987).
30. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 134 Ill. App. 3d 365, 480 N.E.2d 520 (4th Dist. 1985);
Newkirk v. Bigard, 125 I11. App. 3d 454, 466 N.E.2d 243 (5th Dist. 1984); Findley v.
Posway, 118 I11. App. 3d 824, 455 N.E.2d 861 (1st Dist. 1983); Pecora v. Szabo, 109 Ill.
App. 3d 824, 441 N.E.2d 360 (2d Dist. 1982). See also ILL. ANN. SAT. ch. 10A, para.
304(1) (Smith-Hurd 1985) (historical and practice notes) ("reviewing courts have had to
state the proposition that a Rule 304(a) finding does not make a non-final order appeala-
ble repeatedly in dismissing appeals taken from non-final orders to which the finding was
appended").
31. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 788 (C.D. II1. 1982); Ariola
v. Nigro, 13 Ill. 2d 200, 148 N.E.2d 787 (1958).
32. Compare McGrew v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 147 Ill. App. 3d 104, 497
N.E.2d 424 (1st Dist. 1986) (trial judge's order for immediate appeal on exemplary and
punitive damages was not immediately appealable when claims for compensatory dam-
ages on basis of same alleged violations remained pending) with Hise v. Hull, 116 Ill. App.
3d 681, 452 N.E.2d 372 (4th Dist. 1983) (a claim under a statute providing for payment
of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees that is brought as part of responsive pleading
becomes part of the same action and must be disposed of by judgment or by finding that
there is no just reason for delaying appeal).
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IOA, para. 304(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
1989] Carter v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway 1057
304(a) was modelled,34 have stated that a rule 304(a) finding is un-
necessary when a party appeals a final judgment entered on claims
in an action in which severance was ordered.35
C. Northtown Warehouse v. Transamerica Insurance Co.
In Northtown Warehouse v. Transamerica Insurance Co.,36 the
Illinois Supreme Court attempted to clarify the proper rule 304(a)
analysis for actions in which parties try to appeal a final judgment
on a severed claim. The plaintiff in Northtown sued its insurance
agent, I.I.A., Inc., and its insurance company, Transamerica Insur-
ance Company ("Transamerica"), after Transamerica refused to
pay an insurance claim.37 Both defendants filed counterclaims
against each other.3" In response to a motion for separate trials,
the trial court severed both counterclaims from the plaintiff's
claim.3 9 The plaintiff's action proceeded to judgment, the jury re-
turned a verdict against both defendants for $287,428, and the de-
fendants tried to appeal that judgment.'
The Northtown case presented the question of whether a rule
304(a) finding is necessary to appeal a circuit court judgment on an
initial claim before the circuit court has resolved a severed counter-
claim.4 The Northtown court held that because the original case
and the counterclaim created separate causes, the judgment en-
tered on the verdict in the original case was final and was appeala-
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (28 U.S.C. § 54(b) (1987)).
35. See Davis v. Childers, 33 Ill. 2d 297, 211 N.E.2d 364 (1965); Salyers v. Board of
Governors, 69 Ill. App. 3d 356, 387 N.E.2d 1129 (1st Dist. 1979) (appellate court held
rule 304(a) inapplicable because the trial court severed the first two counts involving
allegations of due process violations from counts III and IV which involved allegations of
defamation). See also Sadler v. County of Cook, 108 Ill. App. 3d 175, 438 N.E.2d 1351
(1st Dist. 1982) (although the appellate court held that claims involved in an action for
alleged wrongful discharge from employment were all part of a single action and a special
finding under rule 304(a) was necessary, it recognized that a discretionary severance of
claims or causes of action could result in a separate action under rule 304(a)). For federal
cases interpreting FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), see United States v. O'Neil, 709 F.2d 361 (5th
Cir. 1983); Hebel v. Ebersole, 543 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1976); Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc.
v. Pfizer, Inc., 498 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1974).
36. 111 Ill. 2d 532, 490 N.E.2d 1268 (1986) [hereinafter Northtown].
37. Id. at 533-34, 490 N.E.2d at 1268.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 534, 490 N.E.2d at 1268. A judge's power to order the separation of claims
in a multiple claim action is derived from sections 2-404 and 2-614(b) of the Illinois Civil
Practice Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 2-404, 2-614(b) (1987). Section 2-1006 of
the Illinois Civil Practice Act empowers the judge to sever a claim. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 2-1006 (1987). For the pertinent language of these sections, see supra notes 14-
15.
40. Northtown, 111 111. 2d at 538, 490 N.E.2d at 1269.
41. Id. at 534, 490 N.E.2d at 1269.
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ble without a rule 304(a) finding by the circuit judge.42
The Northtown court relied on the language of rule 304(a),
which states that finding is necessary only when "multiple claims
for relief are involved in an action" and the appeal is taken "from a
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the . . .
claims. ' 43 The court noted that trial courts may order severance of
claims with the intention of creating two separate actions.44 The
Northtown court reasoned that if the plaintiff's claim is unrelated
to and distinct from the counterclaim, then "an appeal should be
allowed from a final judgment entered in the severed action with-
out the findings required by Rule 304(a), just as if the case had
proceeded as a single claim action all along. ' '45
In holding that a rule 304(a) finding is not necessary when par-
ties appeal a final judgment on a severed claim, the Northtown
court followed the reasoning of federal cases construing Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). 46 Adopting the position of the fed-
eral decisions, the Northtown court held that when the trial court
intended to create two separate actions by ordering severance,
42. Id. at 538, 490 N.E.2d at 1270 (citing Northtown Warehouse v. Transamerica
Ins. Co., 131 Ill. App. 3d 274, 278, 475 N.E.2d 901, 905 (1st Dist. 1984)). The appellate
court had dismissed the defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the
circuit court did not make a rule 304 (a) finding. Northtown Warehouse, 131 Il. App. 3d
at 278, 475 N.E.2d at 905. The appellate court reasoned that a special finding under rule
304(a) was necessary because the severed counterclaims of the defendants remained pend-
ing. Id.
43. Northtown, 111 Ill. 2d at 537-38, 490 N.E.2d at 1269-70 (quoting ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 1I10A, para. 304(a) (1987)).
44. Id. at 537, 490 N.E.2d at 1270. The court stated that the trial courts also enter
severance orders merely to provide for separate trials. Id. The Carter court cited the
Northtown court's failure to address this problem fully as a significant flaw in the North-
town opinion. Carter v. Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry., 119 Ill. 2d 296, 304-05, 518 N.E.2d
1031, 1033 (1988). For the Carter court's discussion of Northtown, see infra notes 93-96
and accompanying text.
45. Northtown, 111 Ill. 2d at 537, 490 N.E.2d at 1270.
46. Id. at 537, 490 N.E.2d at 1270. The federal cases that the Northtown court re-
ferred to were United States v. O'Neil, 709 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1983); Hebel v. Ebersole,
543 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1976); Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 498 F.2d 358
(2d Cir. 1974). The federal cases indicate that an appeal from a judgment on a validly
severed claim or party may be taken without a finding that there is no just reason for
delay. See O'Neil, 709 F.2d at 368; Hebel, 543 F.2d at 17; Spencer, White & Prentis, 498
F.2d at 361. Unless the severance amounts to an abuse of discretion the appeal can be
taken. Spencer, White & Prentis, 498 F.2d at 364. To be heard on appeal without a
special finding, the severed claim must bear a separate relationship to the original claim.
Id. A severed claim that is separate and distinct from the original claim is equivalent to a
separate action. Id. Therefore, an appeal should be allowed on the severed action in the
same manner as if it had proceeded as a single-claim action from the beginning. Id.
Thus, in Illinois the appeal would be made under rule 303. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A,
para. 303 (1987). For the pertinent language of rule 303, see supra note 29.
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judgment on either of those actions is appealable without a rule
304(a) finding regardless of the unresolved counterclaims. The
court specifically limited its holding to severed claims that the trial
court intended to proceed as separate actions.48 Thus, judgments
on claims that merely are tried separately would not be appealable
without a rule 304(a) finding.
Initially, it would appear that the application of the Northtown
holding could turn entirely on form. Because a separation of
claims order is designed specifically to provide separate trials on
issues in a single action, an order based on the statutory provisions
permitting separation of claims logically would not create separate
actions.49 Therefore, judgment entered on either branch of the sep-
arated action should not be appealable without a rule 304(a) find-
ing. In contrast, separate trials ordered pursuant to an order for
severance should create separate actions. Given that the trial court
has the option to order separation of claims, the court presumably
would not use a severance order unless the court intended to create
separate actions. Under Northtown, a final judgment on such a sev-
ered action would be appealable without a rule 304(a) finding.50
Unfortunately, the facts of the Northtown case demonstrate that
a purely formalistic application of the opinion cannot be justified.
As noted above, the trial court in Northtown ordered "severance"
in response to a motion for separation of claims. It is not clear
from the opinion whether the trial judge decided to sever the
claims sua sponte,51 or whether the judge simply used the word
47. Northtown, ll 1 11. 2d at 537-38, 490 N.E.2d at 1270. The appellate court stated
that the counterclaims made by the defendants raised separate and distinct issues, which
when decided, would not affect the judgment entered in the plaintiff's case. Id.
48. Id. at 538, 490 N.E.2d at 1270.
49. A judge's power to order the separation of claims in a multiple claim action is
derived from sections 2-404 and 2-614(b) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, paras. 2-404, 2-614(b) (1987). For the pertinent language of the sections,
see supra note 14.
50. This analysis of Northtown is strengthened by the court's reference to Salyers v.
Board of Governors, 69 Ill. App. 3d 356, 387 N.E.2d 1129 (4th Dist. 1979), in which the
appellate court stated that "it is quite clear that where the trial court has made no [rule
304(a)] finding, an appellate court has no jurisdiction and may dismiss the appeal on its
own motion." Id. at 358, 387 N.E.2d at 1130. The court, however, said that rule 304(a),
by its own language, only applies to single actions involving multiple claims. Id. The
rule, therefore, does not apply when multiple parties or multiple claims no longer are
involved in a single action. Consequently, the appellate court in Salyers held that the
summary judgment entered on counts one and two, which involved issues and parties
separate from the two counts that were not severed, was a final judgment appealable
without a rule 304(a) finding. Id.
51. Under section 2-1006 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, the trial judge has the
power to order severance "as an aid to convenience" even when no party has made such a
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"sever" as a generic term to describe the act of providing separate
trials.5 2
Because the claims in Northtown could have been severed but
instead were tried separately pursuant to an order for the separa-
tion of claims, the Northtown opinion failed to clarify when a party
could appeal a final judgment on either a severed or separated
claim without a rule 304(a) finding. Less than two years after de-
ciding Northtown, the Illinois Supreme Court reexamined that
opinion in Carter v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway. 3 Stating
that Northtown could have the effect of "requir[ing] that every los-
ing party in a claim tried separately in a multiple-claim case must
file a notice of appeal . . . to protect against the possibility of an
ultimate determination that the order for separate trials (sever-
ance) may have, in fact, created a separate action," the Carter
court restricted the Northtown holding. 54
III. CARTER V. CHICAGO & ILLINOIS MIDLAND RAILWAY
In Carter v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway,55 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a rule 304(a) finding is necessary to per-
fect appeal of a final judgment on a group of claims separately
tried, regardless of the section of the code relied upon by the circuit
court to bring about the separate trials. 6 The only exception to
the requirement of a rule 304(a) finding arises when the circuit
court's severance order "clearly and unequivocally" states that the
claim, counterclaim, or party has indeed been severed and should
proceed separately from the other claims, counterclaims, or parties
motion. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1006 (1987). See also Knab v. Alden's Irving
Park, Inc., 49 Il1. App. 2d 371, 390, 199 N.E.2d 815, 825 (1st Dist. 1964). In Knab, an
implied warranty suit was brought by the parents of a four-year-old boy who was burned
when his trousers suddenly caught fire. The appellate court held that the trial judge
should have ordered a severance of the third-party complaint by the defendant against
the manufacturer who in turn sued the supplier. Id. The court stated that "a jury under
the circumstances ... would have to have an exceptional sense of discrimination to sepa-
rate the ancillary claims of the various parties and still properly determine the issue in the
main action." Id.
52. Despite the theoretical difference between orders for severance and for separation
of claims and between the various provisions enabling the court to enter such orders,
courts have used the term sever when merely providing for separate trials. See, e.g.,
Northtown Warehouse v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 131 11. App. 3d 274, 278, 475 N.E.2d
901, 905 (1st Dist. 1984); Salyers, 69 I11. App. 3d at 358, 387 N.E.2d at 1130.
53. 119 Ill. 2d 296, 518 N.E.2d 1031 (1988).
54. Id. at 304, 518 N.E.2d at 1037. For a discussion of the importance of timing and
appeals, see supra note 29.
55. 119 Ill. 2d 296, 518 N.E.2d 1031 (1988).
56. Id. at 307, 518 N.E.2d at 1037.
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to the case."
A. Development of the Case
The Carter case began as a wrongful death action brought by
William Carter as the representative of the estates of his wife, Bev-
erly Carter, and his daughter, Tiffany Carter. 8 Mrs. Carter and
Tiffany Carter were killed when their vehicle was involved in an
accident with one of the defendant's trains. The wrongful death
claims were tried together. The jury returned a verdict of $120,000
for the estate of Mrs. Carter and $5,000 for the estate of Tiffany
Carter. The court granted a new trial on the issue of damages for
the wrongful death of Tiffany Carter, ruling that the jury's verdict
was inadequate. Finally, the trial court reduced the damages
awarded for Mrs. Carter's death to $12,000 because the jury found
her ninety percent comparatively negligent. 9
B. Appeal of the Judgment on the Wrongful Death
of Mrs. Carter
Dissatisfied with receiving only ten percent of the $120,000 ver-
dict for the death of Mrs. Carter, the plaintiff appealed the judg-
ment entered on that claim. 6 At this point the plaintiff first
encountered difficulties under rule 304(a). Because the trial court
granted a new trial for damages on the claim regarding Tiffany
Carter, that claim was not yet resolved.6' The claims of Mrs.
Carter and Tiffany Carter were tried jointly, and the judgment in
Mrs. Carter's case resolved less than all the claims between the
plaintiff and the defendant. 62 Thus, until the damages for the Tif-
fany Carter claim were determined in the new trial, the judgment
in Mrs. Carter's case was neither final nor appealable under rule
304(a) without a rule 304(a) finding.
The appellate court dismissed the appeal because the trial court
had not made a rule 304(a) finding. 63 The plaintiff later obtained a
rule 304(a) finding on the judgment and proceeded with his appeal,
but the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. 6' Thus,
the plaintiff was left with a judgment of $12,000 for the death of
57. Id. at 307-08, 518 N.E.2d at 1037.
58. Id. at 297, 518 N.E.2d at 1032.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 298, 518 N.E.2d at 1032.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Mrs. Carter; moreover, the only chance for increasing the recovery
from the wrongful death actions was the new trial for damages on
the Tiffany Carter claim.
C. New Trial on Damages for Tiffany's Estate
Apparently, the defendant's strategy was to avoid any increased
liability on the Tiffany Carter claim while the plaintiff was appeal-
ing the judgment on the wrongful death claim of Mrs. Carter.65
First, the defendant petitioned the appellate court for leave to ap-
peal the order granting a new trial for damages on that claim.66
After the court dismissed the defendant's petition, the defendant
filed a counterclaim for contribution against Beverly Carter's estate
based on the jury's finding in the initial action that Mrs. Carter was
ninety percent responsible for the accident.67 If the defendant's
counterclaim was successful, the defendant could obtain reim-
bursement from the estate of Beverly Carter for ninety percent of
any damages granted in the new trial for damages on the Tiffany
Carter claim.68
The appellate court severed the defendant's counterclaim from
the damages trial on the Tiffany Carter claim.69 The trial for dam-
ages proceeded, and the jury returned a new verdict of $200,000
for the plaintiff.7" In order to appeal this new verdict, the defend-
ant requested that the court make a rule 304(a) finding that there
was "no just reason" for delaying his appeal. 7'
The defendant requested a rule 304(a) finding because the de-
fendant's counterclaim against Mrs. Carter's estate for contribu-
tion was still pending.72 The defendant apparently considered the
pending counterclaim against Mrs. Carter's estate and the new
trial for damages in the Tiffany Carter estate to be parts of a single
action despite the fact that the two claims were severed. 73 Because
65. See id. at 299, 518 N.E.2d at 1033.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 298, 518 N.E.2d 1033.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 298-99, 518 N.E.2d at 1033.
73. See id. Later, on the same day that the court entered the rule 304(a) finding
permitting the defendant's appeal of the new judgment for damages in the Tiffany Carter
claim, the trial court dismissed defendant's counterclaim against Mrs. Carter's estate for
contributioi. The court relied on Laue v. Leifheit, 105 I11. 2d 191, 196, 473 N.E.2d 939,
942 (1984), for the proposition that a contribution claim not asserted during the original
action is barred. Carter, 119 I11. 2d at 300, 518 N.E.2d at 1033. The defendant also
appealed the dismissed counterclaim pursuant to rule 303. Id. at 299, 518 N.E.2d at
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the new judgment for damages for Tiffany Carter's estate was "fi-
nal... as to one... but fewer than all of the claims" in this action,
the defendant interpreted rule 304(a) as precluding appeal of that
judgment unless a rule 304(a) finding was made.7 4
The appellate court waited for the Illinois Supreme Court's
opinion in Northtown Warehouse v. Transamerica Insurance Co."
prior to considering the defendant's appeal on the new judgment
for damages in the Tiffany Carter claim.76 Furthermore, the plain-
tiff used the rule set forth in Northtown to challenge the timeliness
of the defendant's appeal.77 The Carter plaintiff contended that the
judgment on the last motion filed was a final order under North-
town; therefore, the defendant should have filed his appeal within
thirty days from the denial of the motion under rule 303(a)(l). 7 s
Accordingly, the plaintiff contended that the defendant's appeal
under the time limit prescribed by rule 303(a).79
In response to the plaintiff's argument, the defendant relied on
the fact that on the day the trial court denied the post-trial motion
in the new trial for damages, the defendant's contribution counter-
claim against Mrs. Carter's estate was still pending.8" As previ-
ously stated, the defendant reasoned that a rule 304(a) finding was
1033. The dismissal of the counterclaim, which was the last controversy decided before
the trial court, terminated the litigation. Thus, the rights of Carter and Illinois Midland
were absolutely determined, and the only thing remaining was the execution of the
$200,000 judgment against Illinois Midland. For the definition of a final judgment, see
supra note 27. Consequently, the defendant believed that the appeal on the dismissed
counterclaim should be taken under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 303 (1987) (ad-
dressing appeals from final judgments of the circuit court in civil cases). Carter, 119 I11.
2d at 299, 518 N.E.2d at 1033. For the language of rule 303, see supra note 29.
74. Carter, 119 I11. 2d at 300, 518 N.E.2d at 1034.
75. 111 I11. 2d 532, 490 N.E.2d 1268 (1986).
76. Carter v. Chicago & I11. Midland Ry., 144 I11. App. 3d 437, 439, 494 N.E.2d 892,
894 (4th Dist. 1986).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 438, 494 N.E.2d at 893. The defendant had filed a post-trial motion on the
new judgment of $200,000 for the Tiffany Carter claim. Id. This motion was denied on
February 14, 1985. Id. The defendant obtained a rule 304(a) finding for the judgment on
the Tiffany Carter claim on March 28, 1985. Id. The defendant's appeal was taken under
rule 304(a) from the judgment in favor of Tiffany Carter's estate within 30 days from the
rule 304(a) finding, but more than 30 days after the defendant's post-trial motion was
denied. If the defendant did not need a rule 304(a) finding in order to appeal the new
judgment, the timing of the appeal was governed by rule 303(a)(1). See id. Rule
303(a)(1) requires a defendant to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the denial of
the last post-trial motion in the case. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 303(a)(1)
(1987). Because the Carter defendant's notice of appeal was not filed within that time
period, the appeal would be time barred unless rule 304(a) governed the appeal. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
79. Carter, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 438, 494 N.E.2d at 893.
80. Id. at 439, 494 N.E.2d at 893.
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required because the denial of the last motion in the case did not
dispose of all the issues between the parties."' Challenging the ap-
plicability of the Northtown holding, the defendant asserted that its
appeal under rule 304(a) was both appropriate and timely. 2
Following the decision in Northtown, the appellate court dis-
missed the defendant's appeal as untimely.8 3 The appellate court
stated that because the denial of the defendant's post-trial motion
was a final order, the timing of the appeal was governed by rule
303 and should have been taken within thirty days after the denial
of the last motion in the case. 4 The supreme court granted the
defendant's petition for leave to appeal the appellate court's deci-
sion in order to reexamine the Northtown decision and the interpre-
tation of rule 304(a) therein.85
D. The Supreme Court's Decision
The supreme court began its reexamination of Northtown by re-
viewing the purpose behind rule 304(a). The court noted that rule
304(a) and its predecessor, section 50(2) of the Civil Practice Act,8 6
were designed to prevent piecemeal appeals and to clarify when a
litigant may appeal a judgment that determines less than all the
matters involved in an action.87 Rule 304(a) and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b) share the same underlying policy; 8 however,
the Illinois Legislature used different language in order to avoid the
confusion experienced by the federal courts interpreting rule
54(b). 9 Consequently, the Illinois Legislature designed the rule
304(a) to "apply to final judgments or decrees determining fewer
than 'all the claims or rights and liabilities.' "90 In contrast, rule
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 442, 494 N.E.2d at 896.
84. Id. at 440-41, 494 N.E.2d at 895.
85. Carter v. Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry., 119 Ill. 2d 296, 300, 518 N.E.2d 1031, 1034
(1988).
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 50(2) (1955) (repealed 1967).
87. Carter, 119 Ill. 2d at 302, 518 N.E.2d at 1034 (citing Jenner, Tone & Martin,
Historical & Practice Notes, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 1A, para. 304(a) (Smith-Hurd 1985)).
For a discussion regarding the policy behind rule 304(a) and its predecessor section 50(2)
of the Civil Practice Act, see supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
88. Carter, 119 Ill. 2d at 302, 518 N.E.2d 1034-35.
89. Id. at 302, 518 N.E.2d at 1035 (citing Ariola v. Nigro, 13 Ill. 2d 200, 206-07, 148
N.E.2d 787, 790 (1958)). For a discussion of the difficulties encountered by federal courts
when adjudicating appeals from a severed or separated claim or party, see Spencer, White
& Prentis, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 498 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1974).
90. Carter, 119 Ill. 2d at 302, 518 N.E.2d at 1035 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
I 10A, para. 304(a) (1987)).
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54(b) applies to an "entry of final judgment upon one or more but
less than all of the claims." 91 The Carter court reasoned that this
language was a notification to litigants that a rule 304(a) finding is
mandatory in almost all cases that originate from a multiple-claim
controversy.92
The supreme court then considered whether the holding in
Northtown furthered the goals of rule 304(a). 93 The court antici-
pated that the Northtown holding, as applied by the appellate court
in Carter, would result in uncertainty in the future for parties on
appeal.94 The Carter court recognized that the Northtown court
had neglected to consider that certain multiple claims may not be
severable in the true sense of the word. 95 Because of this flaw in
Northtown, the Carter court concluded that the holding in North-
town did not aid litigants in deciding how to appeal a judgment
adjudicating fewer than all the matters involved. 96 Therefore, the
supreme court reversed the order of the appellate court dismissing
the defendant's appeal and remanded with directions to consider
the merits of the appeal.97
91. Ariola v. Nigro, 13 Ill. 2d 200, 204, 148 N.E.2d 787, 790 (1958) (quoting FED. R.
Civ. P. 54(b)).
92. See Carter, 119 III. 2d at 308, 518 N.E.2d at 1037.
93. Id. at 304, 518 N.E.2d at 1035.
94. Id. The appellate court in Carter dismissed the appeal notwithstanding the rule
304(a) finding because the court considered the rule 304(a) finding inapplicable. Accord-
ingly, the appellate court determined that the timing provisions in rule 303 barred the
appeal. Id. at 300, 518 N.E.2d at 1033-34 (citing Carter v. Chicago & I11. Midland Ry.,
144 I11. App. 3d 437, 494 N.E.2d 892 (1986)). See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying
text.
95. The supreme court stated that the various rules of procedure dealing with sever-
ability and separate trials are not distinct from each other and should not be relied upon
by judges in determining whether to allow an appeal without a special finding under rule
304(a). Carter, 119 Il1. 2d at 306-07, 518 N.E.2d at 1036-37. Furthermore, the court
stated that the words and phrases appellate courts used previously to determine whether
an action was severed and could proceed thereafter as a separate case did not help practi-
tioners or circuit judges in determining whether a rule 304(a) finding was necessary. Id.
at 305, 518 N.E.2d at 1036. The Carter court specifically rejected reliance on phrases
such as "separate actions" or "separate issues and parties" to determine whether an ac-
tion has been severed so that the action would proceed as a separate case. Id. (citing
Sadler v. County of Cook, 108 Il1. App. 3d 175, 438 N.E.2d 1129 (1st Dist. 1982); Chi-
cago Miniature Lamp Works, Inc. v. D'Amico, 78 I11. App. 3d 269, 397 N.E.2d 138 (1st
Dist. 1979); Salyers v. Board of Governors, 69 I11. App. 3d 356, 387 N.E.2d 1129 (4th
Dist. 1979)). Additionally, the Carter court noted that Northtown categorized the motion
for severance as a motion under section 2-614(b). Id. at 307, 518 N.E.2d at 1037 (citing
Northtown Warehouse v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 111 IIll. 2d 532, 534, 490 N.E.2d 1268,
1269). Section 2-614(b), however, deals with the ordering of separate trials, not with
severance. Id.
96. Carter, 119 Ill. 2d at 307-08, 518 N.E.2d at 1037.
97. Id. at 308, 518 N.E.2d at 1037.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Carter court rejected the "sweeping" language used in
Northtown because that language permitted an appeal of judgments
whenever an appellate court, using a case-by-case analysis, deter-
mined that the trial court had intended to treat the claim as a sepa-
rate action.9" The court recognized, however, that the result of the
Northtown rule, permitting appeals without a rule 304(a) finding,
was beneficial in certain cases.99 Therefore, the Carter court chose
to restrict the Northtown rule to a limited, easily recognized class
of cases in which separate trials had been ordered.1°° The court
defined this class as those cases in which a trial court ordered sev-
erance pursuant to the Illinois provisions for the severance of ac-
tions and explicitly stated in the severance order that the claim or
counterclaim had indeed "been severed (in the narrow sense of the
word) and that the severed claim, counterclaim or party shall pro-
ceed thereafter separate from the other claims, counterclaims or
parties to the case."'' Finally, the Carter court stated that even
when the severance is ordered pursuant to the proper code provi-
sion and the order uses the word "sever" or "severance," the cir-
cuit judge still should provide the certainty of a rule 304(a) finding
or an explicit statement of severance in the narrow sense. 0 2 By
setting up this new test, the Carter court hoped to establish the
greater certainty for parties making appeals in multi-claim contro-
versies that was expected from the enactment of rule 304(a). 10 3
The most significant aspect of the Carter decision is the fact that
Carter creates an exception to the usual case-by-case approach for
determining when a rule 304(a) finding is necessary to perfect an
appeal. The Carter court adopted the Northtown court's recogni-
tion that a judgment on separately tried claims should be final and
appealable without a rule 304(a) finding in some cases. The Carter
court made the Northtown rule easily applicable by refining the
Northtown "separate and distinct claim test"' as claims that have
been "severed" pursuant to a particular code provision and that
98. Id. at 305-06, 518 N.E.2d at 1036.
99. Id. at 307-08, 518 N.E.2d at 1037.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 308, 518 N.E.2d at 1037. In cases involving judgments as to fewer than all
of the parties or claims, rule 304(a) should be the general rule, and rule 303(a)(1) should
be the exception. Id. Therefore, the Carter court stated that the language in Northtown
indicating otherwise must give way to the Carter holding. Id.
103. Id. at 307-08, 518 N.E.2d at 1037.
104. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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have been described by the trial court as claims which should pro-
ceed separately from the other claims of the case. 05
By restricting the Northtown rule, the Carter court furthered the
goals of rule 304(a). First, the rule will still operate to discourage
piecemeal appeals because the trial court remains obligated to re-
view the facts and circumstances of most cases and enter a rule
304(a) finding before judgment resolving only part of an action
may be appealed. Second, parties seeking to appeal in multiple-
claim actions can ascertain with certainty that there is only one set
of circumstances in which a rule 304(a) finding will not be required
before such an appeal can proceed. Finally, the decision in Carter
is likely to promote judicial economy by reducing the number of
cases in which an appellate court must dismiss an appeal of a final
judgment adjudicating less than all the issues in controversy for
lack of jurisdiction in the absence of a rule 304(a) finding.
The Carter decision, however, does not eliminate all of the un-
certainty surrounding the appeal of a final judgment when other
matters in the action remain pending. The uncertainty in the ap-
plication of rule 304(a) arises from the case-by-case analysis re-
quired in most situations. Litigants will continue to struggle with
the question of whether the judgment to be appealed resolves issues
wholly independent from the remaining claims. Accordingly, the
trial court will determine whether a just reason to delay an appeal
exists. The litigants, however, no longer must question whether a
rule 304(a) finding is necessary for an appeal.
V. IMPACT
To take advantage of the decision in Carter, attorneys represent-
ing parties in actions with severable claims should take great care
when filing motions for severance. First, the attorney must be cer-
tain that the order is grounded in the provision for severance
rather than a provision for separate trials. Next, the attorney
should request that the severance order state that the claim has
indeed been severed. Finally, the attorney should request that the
order specify that the severed claims can proceed thereafter sepa-
rate from the original claims. 0 6 If the circuit court chooses not to
comply with any of these requests, the judgment is not appealable
and "is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judg-
ment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the
105. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
106. See Carter, 119 Il1. 2d at 307-08, 518 N.E.2d at 1037.
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parties." 07
The trial court should continue to use its sound discretion when
ordering the severance and separation of trials. The trial court
may enter a severance order with all the elements in Carter if it so
chooses. Presumably, the trial court will recognize the significance
of a severance motion requesting a severance order that satisfies
Carter and will use care, both in deciding whether to grant the
motion and in writing the order. Notably, a trial court's failure to
issue a severance order satisfying Carter does not preclude the pos-
sibility of an immediate appeal of the judgment on the claims in
question. Rather, the parties can still request a rule 304(a) finding
after the court enters judgment on the group of claims. Still, the
court can avoid the necessity of considering motions requesting
rule 304(a) findings in appropriate cases by using care when draft-
ing severance orders. If the circuit court decides that there is just
reason for delay and does not allow an appeal, then the petitioner
will have to wait until the initial claim is resolved before taking an
appeal on the severed claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
Carter v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway 10 8 held that a rule
304(a) finding was necessary to make the judgment of a separately
tried issue appealable, regardless of the section of the code relied
upon by the trial court to bring about the separate trial of a claim
or counterclaim. 10 9 Prior to Carter, the appellate courts of Illinois
expressed much confusion as to the necessity of an express finding
that there was "no just reason for delaying""10 before the decision
on a severed claim or party could be appealed. I ' After Carter,
judges and practitioners will be able to determine with greater cer-
tainty whether the requirements of rule 304(a) are satisfied. Fur-
thermore, practitioners will no longer have to worry about whether
an appellate court will throw out their appeals absent a rule 304(a)
finding on the judgment. Finally, the Carter court has stated that
the general policy of rule 304(a) should control, and that permit-
ting an immediate appeal of a judgment on certain severed claims
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 304(a) (1987).
108. 119 I11. 2d 296, 518 N.E.2d 1031 (1988).
109. Id. at 307, 518 N.E.2d at 1037.
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 304(a) (1987).
111. Carter, 119 I11. 2d at 307, 518 N.E.2d at 1037.
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without a rule 304(a) finding will be a limited exception rather than
the standard.
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